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Methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying the evolution of
cooperation in social dilemma games. However, recent empirical research shows that
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is only one kind of a more general class of
behavior, namely moral behavior, which includes reciprocity, respecting others’ property,
honesty, equity, efficiency, as well as many others. Inspired by these experimental works,
we here open up the path toward studying other forms of moral behavior with methods
of statistical physics. We argue that this is a far-reaching direction for future research that
can help us answer fundamental questions about human sociality. Why did our societies
evolve as they did? What moral principles are more likely to emerge? What happens
when different moral principles clash? Can we predict the break out of moral conflicts
in advance and contribute to their solution? These are amongst the most important
questions of our time, and methods of statistical physics could lead to new insights and
contribute toward finding answers.
Keywords: cooperation, social dilemma, public good, statistical physics, network science, evolutionary game
theory, moral behavior, reciprocity
1. INTRODUCTION
Our time now is unique and special in that we are arguably richer, safer, and healthier than
ever before [1, 2], but simultaneously, we are also facing some of the greatest challenges of our
evolution. Climate change, the depletion of natural resources, staggering inequality, the spread of
misinformation, persistent armed conflicts, just to name a few examples, all require our best efforts
to act together and to renounce part of our individual interests for the greater good. Understanding
when, why, and how people deviate from their best self-interest to act pro-socially, benefitting
other people and the society as a whole, is thus amongst the most important aims of contemporary
scientific research.
Pro-social behavior can come in many forms, the most studied of which is cooperation. Indeed,
cooperation is so important that many have contended that our capacity to cooperate at large
scales with unrelated others is what makes human societies so successful [3–14]. Moreover, the
psychological basis of cooperation, shared intentionality, that is, “the ability and motivation to
engage with others in collaborative, co-operative activities with joint goals and intentions” is what
makes humans uniquely human, as it is possessed by children, but not by great apes [15].
Although human cooperation is believed to originate from our evolutionary struggles for
survival [16], it is clear that the challenges that pressured our ancestors into cooperation today
are gone. Nevertheless, we are still cooperating, and on ever larger scales, to the point that we may
deserve being called “SuperCooperators” [17]. Taking nothing away from the immense importance
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of cooperation for our evolutionary success and for the wellbeing
of our societies, recent empirical research shows, however, that
to cooperate is just a particular manifestation of moral behavior
[18]. And while methods of statistical physics have been used
prolifically to study cooperation [14], other forms of moral
behavior have not. Our goal here is to discuss and outline the
many possibilities for future research at the interface between
physics and moral behavior, beyond the traditional framework of
cooperation in social dilemmas.
2. COOPERATION
To study cooperative behavior, scientists use social dilemma
games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma [19], the stag hunt [20],
or the public goods game [21]. In these games, players have to
decide whether to cooperate or to defect: cooperation maximizes
the payoff of the group, while defection maximizes the payoff
of an individual. This leads to a conflict between individual and
group interests, which is at the heart of each social dilemma, and
in particular at the heart of the cooperation problem.
Since cooperating is not individually optimal, cooperative
behavior cannot evolve among self-interested individuals, unless
other mechanisms are at play. Several mechanisms for the
evolution of cooperation have been identified and studied,
including kin selection [22], direct reciprocity [23], indirect
reciprocity [24], social preferences [25–28], the internalization
of social heuristics [29], translucency [30], cooperative equilibria
[12, 31, 32], as well as many others.
One realistic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation
is network reciprocity. Everyday interactions among humans
do not happen in a vacuum. We are more likely to interact
and cooperate within our network of family members, friends,
and coworkers, and we rarely interact, let alone cooperate, with
strangers. One can formalize this situation by assuming that
individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and interact only with
their neighbors. Can this spatial structure promote the evolution
of cooperation? The answer is yes [33]. And the intuition is
that, in this setting, cooperators can form clusters and protect
themselves from the invasion of defectors [34–36]. These “games
on graphs are difficult to analyze mathematically,” but “are easy
to study by computer simulations” [9]. Games on networks
present the natural setting in which one can apply the techniques
and methods of statistical physics and network science to study
cooperation [37, 38], as well as other forms of moral behavior.
3. STATISTICAL PHYSICS OF HUMAN
COOPERATION
Methods of statistical physics have come a long way in improving
our understanding of the emergence of cooperation and the
phase transitions leading to other counterintuitive evolutionary
outcomes. Research has revealed that these depend sensitively
on the structure of the interaction network and the type of
interactions, as well as on the number and type of competing
strategies [39–49]. Aspects particularly relevant to human
cooperation have also been studied in much detail [14]. The
workhorse behind this research has been the spatial public
goods game [50, 51], with extensions toward different forms of
punishment [52–58], rewarding [59–62], and tolerance [63], to
name just some examples. The Monte Carlo method is thereby
typically used [64], which ensures that the treatment is aligned
with fundamental principles of statistical physics, enabling a
comparison of obtained results with generalized mean-field
approximations [65–67] and a proper determination of phase
transitions between different stable strategy configurations [45].
The goal is to identify and understand pattern formation, the
spatiotemporal dynamics of solutions, and the principles of self-
organization that may lead to socially favorable evolutionary
outcomes.
An example of an impressively intricate phase diagram,
obtained from studying an 8-strategy public goods game with
diverse tolerance levels, is presented in Figure 1 of Szolnoki
and Perc [63]. There, it can be observed that the higher the
value of the multiplication factor in the public goods game, the
higher the tolerance can be, and vice versa. This observation
resonates with our naive expectation and perception of tolerance
in that overly tolerant strategies cannot survive in the presence
of other less tolerant strategies. From the viewpoint of the
considered evolutionary game this is not surprising, because
players adopting the most tolerant strategy act as loners only
if everybody else in the group is a defector. And such sheer
unlimited tolerance is simply not competitive with other less
tolerant strategies. Also, if the cost of inspection is too high, or
if the value of the multiplication factor is either very low or very
high, then tolerant players cannot survive even if they exhibit
different levels of tolerance.
While it is beyond the scope of this work to go further
into details, it should be noted that phase diagrams as the one
presented in Figure 1 of Szolnoki and Perc [63] provide an in-
depth understanding of the evolutionary dynamics and of the
phase transitions that lead from one stable strategy configuration
to the other. The key for obtaining accurate locations of phase
transition points and the correct phases is the application of
the stability analysis of competing subsystem solutions [64].
A subsystem solution can be formed by any subset of all the
competing strategies, and on their own (if separated from other
strategies) these subsystems solutions are stable. This is trivially
true if the subsystem solution is formed by a single strategy,
but can be likewise true if more than one strategy forms such a
solution. The dominant subsystem solution, and hence the phase
that is ultimately depicted in the phase diagram as the stable
solution of the whole system, can only be determined by letting
all the subsystem solutions compete against each other.
By means of this approach, several important insights
have been obtained. By peer-based strategies, for example,
we note the importance of indirect territorial competition
in peer punishment [68], the spontaneous emergence of
cyclic dominance in rewarding [59], and an exotic first-
order phase transition observed with correlated strategies
[69]. By institutionalized strategies, we have the fascinating
spatiotemporal complexity that is due to pool punishment
[53], while in the realm of self-organization of incentives for
cooperation, we have the elevated effectiveness of adaptive
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punishment [54], the possibility of probabilistic sharing to
solve the problem of costly punishment [56], and the many
evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding [61]. With
antisocial strategies, we have the restoration of the effectiveness
of prosocial punishment when accounting for second-order free-
riding on antisocial punishment [58], and the rather surprising
lack of adverse effects with antisocial rewarding [62].
While this is just a short snippet of statistical physics
research concerning human cooperation, it hopefully showcases
successfully the potency of the approach for studying complex
mathematical models that describe human behavior, thus
recommending itself also for relevantly studying other types of
moral behavior to which we attend to in what follows.
4. MORAL BEHAVIOR
Empirical research has indeed shown that cooperation in social
dilemmas is only one facet of a more general class of behavior
– moral behavior. When subjects are asked to report what they
think is the morally right thing to do in social dilemmas, they
typically answer: “to cooperate” [18].
Morality is universal across human societies. Virtually all
societies adopt behavioral rules that are presented to the people as
moral principles. But where do these rules come from? A classical
non-scientific explanation, still adopted by many societies and
religious thinkers, is that they are emanated directly from God.
However, in recent years, social scientists have been developing a
scientific theory of morality, according to whichmorality evolved
as a a mechanism “to promote and sustain cooperation” [70].
As psychology-star Michael Tomasello put it: “human morality
arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating
with others” [71]. Similar positions have also been put forward in
Rawls [72], Mackie [73], Wong [74], Rai and Fiske [75], Curry
[76], and Curry et al. [77]. However, the word “cooperation”
in these statements does not refer only to cooperation in social
dilemmas. How does this general form of cooperation translates
into specific behaviors?
A recent study exploring morality in 60 societies across
the world found that seven moral rules are universal: love
your family, help your group, return favors, be brave, defer to
authority, be fair, and respect others’ property. Although, what
is not universal is how they are ranked [77]. Of course, not all
these rules are easy to study using simple games on networks, but
some are. For example, “returning favors” can be studied using a
sequential prisoner’s dilemma, in which the players do not choose
their strategy simultaneously, but sequentially. Alternatively, it
can be studied using the trust game [78]. In the trust game, player
1 starts with a sum of money and has to decide how much of
it, if any, to transfer to player 2. Any amount transferred gets
multiplied by a factor larger than 1 and handed to player 2. Then
player 2 has to decide how much of it to keep and howmuch of it
to return to player 1.
Similarly, “help your group” can be studied using games with
labeled players, in which agents come with a label representing
the group(s) they belong to [79]. “Fairness” can be studied using
the ultimatum game [80], as has already been done along these
lines [45, 81–90], or the dictator game [91]. “Respect others’
property” can be studied using games with special frames, as,
for example, the Dictator game in the Take frame, for which it is
known that taking is considered to be more morally wrong than
giving [92].
Beyond these seven rules, there are other forms of moral
behavior that are worth studying, as, for example, “honesty.” A
common game theoretic paradigm to study honest behavior is the
sender-receiver game [93]. In this game, player 1 is given a private
information (for example, the outcome of a die) and is asked to
communicate this piece of information to player 2. Player 1 can
either communicate the truthful piece of information, or can lie.
The role of player 2 is to guess the original piece of information.
If player 2 guesses the original piece of information, then players
1 and 2 are both paid according to some option A. Conversely,
if player 2 does not guess the original piece of information, then
players 1 and 2 are both paid according to option B. Crucially,
only player 1 knows the payoffs associated with options A and
B. A variant of this game in which player 2 makes no choice has
also been introduced and studied [94, 95], in order to avoid the
confound of sophisticated deception, that is, players who tell the
truth because they believe that player 2 will not believe them [96].
Other important forms of moral behavior that ought to be
investigated are “equity,” that is, a desire to minimize payoff
differences among players; “efficiency,” that is, a desire to
maximize the total welfare; and “maximin,” that is, a desire
to maximize the worse off payoff. These types of behavior are
usually studied using simple distribution experiments, in which
people have to decide between two or more allocations of money
[18, 27, 28, 97, 98].
5. DISCUSSION
Methods of statistical physics and network science have proven
to be very valuable for successfully studying the evolution
of cooperation in social dilemma games. However, empirical
research shows that this kind of behavior is only one form of
a more general class of moral behavior. The later includes love
your family, help your group, return favors, be brave, defer to
authority, be fair, respect others’ property, honesty, equity, and
efficiency, as well as many others.We have outlined a set of games
and mathematical models that could be used efficiently to study
particular aspects of some of these forms of moral behavior.
Taken together, the application of statistical physics to study
the evolution of moral behavior has the potential to become a
flourishing and vibrant avenue for future research. We believe so
for two reasons. In the first place, it would allow us to understand
why our societies evolved as they did and which moral principles
are more likely to evolve. Secondly, since many social conflicts
are ultimately conflicts between different moral positions [99–
101], exploring the evolution of moral behavior could allow us
to predict in advance the consequences of a moral conflict, and
suggest strategies to avoid it or, in case it is unavoidable, strategies
to minimize its costs. We hope that at least parts of our vision will
be put to practice in the near future.
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